Research on the Incentive Model of Express Packaging Recycling Based on the Three-Party Game Model

Abstract

Reverse logistics, a new logistics model with the advantages of resource conservation and environmental protection, has emerged in response to the strong negative externalities of traditional logistics. However, in a fully competitive market environment, enterprises generally do not actively implement reverse logistics based on their own profitability and competitiveness considerations. In order to explore the impact of various factors on the implementation of reverse logistics by enterprises, an incentive model based on the three-party game model for express packaging recycling is constructed from the perspective of the participating subjects in the process of reverse logistics. This is a three-party evolutionary game model that includes the government, express packaging recycling enterprises, and consumers, then analyzes the stability of strategic choices and equilibrium points of the game system of the three-party subjects in the implementation of the reverse logistics. The results show that when the incentives from the central government can fully cover the cost of the local government’s choice of active regulation strategy, it will lead the system to stabilize at the strategy combination of implementing reverse logistics, actively regulating, and participating in reverse logistics.